

Landholding in Satsuma, 1868-1877

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The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marks the beginning of a new era for Japan and of growing conservatism for Satsuma. Paradoxically, the success in the modernization of the nation was in large measure attributable to the vision, statesmanship, and determination of young leaders from Satsuma. These leaders applied to the national scene a program of industrialization and economic organization which had been initiated previously in their own *han*. Mid-nineteenth century Satsuma, under the wise leadership of Shimazu Nariakira, was certainly one of the most powerful and progressive areas in the country. Nariakira was not a dilettante dabbling with Western gadgets. He was seriously interested in Western studies and realized the significance to state power of such subjects as chemistry and physics. In Japan he was a pioneer in experimenting with telegraphy, gas lamps, photography, and even in the use of *romaji*. He had actively promoted industries such as ceramics, glassmaking, textile manufacturing which utilized water power, iron smelting, and armaments. It is to his credit that only one year after Commodore Perry left Japan Satsuma was ready to sail the first steamship made in Japan. It was the dynamic energy exemplified by these varied enterprises which enabled Satsuma to lead the Restoration.

After 1868 the same region of Satsuma, soon after renamed Kagoshima prefecture, lost this progressive thrust and steadily

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fell behind the rest of the nation in economic development. In 1877 the samurai of this region rose up in a reactionary rebellion which sorely tested the strength of the fledgling central government, and even today Kagoshima is described as the north pole of conservatism. For a variety of reasons Satsuma was unable to keep pace with the rapid social, cultural, and economic changes which the central government forced upon the nation. The effect of government reforms in Satsuma during the critical period between 1868 and 1877 was to eliminate or seriously weaken the potential for leadership which derived from the old feudal structure, while strengthening the samurai domination of the agrarian society, thus perpetuating conservatism.

This paper will concern itself mainly with the process by which the center of economic gravity in Satsuma shifted to this most conservative group, the samurai-farmer. The central government reforms which were instrumental in this shift were three: (1) the *hanseki hōkan* movement of 1869 caused the retrocession of feudal domains to Imperial control; (2) the *hai-han chi-ken* (or "abolish the *han*; establish prefectures") movement removed local administrative control from the daimyo and placed it more directly under central government administration; (3) the *chisō kaisei*, or land tax reform of 1873, established the principle of private ownership of land. These measures are well known and will not be described here in detail. Less studied are the effects which these reforms had upon the various strata of Satsuma society.¹ Two broad categories of landholding interests in Satsuma must be described. First, in the castle-town of Kagoshima, the administrative seat of Satsuma *han*, there resided, beside the daimyo and other powerful independent landholders, numerous bureaucrats and rank-and-file samurai who depended upon the land for their income. Second, in the rural districts there resided even more samurai who administered the countryside, and often directly engaged in agricultural production. Their interests were closely related to their control of the peasant units known as *kado*, which will be discussed in detail below.

The daimyo was phased out of political control in the *han* by the successive slogans of *hanseki hōkan* and *hai-han chi-ken*. With the removal of the daimyo from the local scene the power

structure of feudal Satsuma was drastically altered, if not eliminated. The Shimazu daimyo had controlled the *han* for a period of over seven hundred years, longer than any other daimyo dynasty in Japan. Thus the prestige of the Shimazu had been tremendous within the *han*. It had been used in the past both for progressive and reactionary measures. In 1869 the Shimazu daimyo was in the forefront in the *hanseki hōkan* movement, being a signatory to the petition requesting permission to return the feudal domain to the emperor. When the petition was accepted in the same year, the daimyo lost his territory and his title. In return the government provided him with an annual pension equal to one-tenth of his former revenue. This settlement left him a rich man,² for he was also relieved of old debts and freed from the expenses of maintaining a feudal administration. For a brief while he continued to be the symbol of local authority, but in 1871 the establishment of the prefectural system of government ushered in the newly appointed Governor Ōyama as chief executive of Kagoshima prefecture.³ The ex-daimyo was left with only his family estate to manage, and he was removed from the seat of his former domain by an order of the central government to establish his residence in Tokyo.

The powerful territorial lords were also severely reduced in their influence in Satsuma politics. For centuries there has been in Satsuma a few great families possessing their own domains for which they maintained a separate administration and army, though their organization was virtually identical in structure to that of the daimyo's. These lords were the vassals of the Shimazu daimyo, and they were among the more powerful members of the council which advised him on important matters. When Lord Shimazu Tadayoshi petitioned to surrender his territory to the emperor, his vassals could do no less than make gestures of relinquishing their feudal holdings to him.⁴ Thus when the daimyo was relieved of his domain these vassals also found themselves bereft of their fiefs. However, just as the ex-daimyo received a generous financial settlement, his vassals probably suffered no great economic hardship.* Though they

* The lord of Iriki, for example, received a hereditary emolument of 300 *koku* from the central government as well as an annual payment of

were shorn of their political power and responsibilities, they were also relieved of the costs of maintaining an administrative staff and large military force.⁵

The Shimazu daimyo had been rated one of the wealthiest feudal lords in Tokugawa Japan. He was credited with an income of about 720,000 *koku* of rice (one *koku* = 4.9629 bushels), although in fact this was a highly inflated figure because Satsuma was the only *han* reporting its yield in terms of unhulled rice. About 55 per cent or more of this total yield had been assigned to various samurai as *kyūchi taka*, or salary land grants.⁶ The remainder was called *kura-iri taka* because the yield went into the *han* grain storage (*kura*) for general state expenditures. The *kyūchi taka* or salary land grants were of two types. Kagoshima *taka* provided compensation for *jōkashi*, samurai of the castle-town; *tokoro taka* was assigned to *gōshi*, samurai residing in the *gō* or rural districts.⁷

The *kyūchi taka*, or salary land grants, was a system for rewarding and maintaining the huge number of samurai in Satsuma. This method of compensation, found in the Tokugawa period only in Satsuma, is called *chigyō seido*, loosely translated as a system of enfeoffment. However, the samurai who was granted a certain *taka* (yield), did not become a landowner. The land still belonged to the *han* (*kan chi*, official land). The *taka-mochi* or *taka* grantee, was given the rights to a fixed rice income from the land assigned to him. In short, instead of the peasant cultivator delivering the rice tax to the *han* granary, as in the case of *kura-iri taka*, the *kyūchi taka* was turned over directly to the samurai. Peasants who worked the salary land also owed labor services to the *taka* holder.

Not all samurai were favored by grants of *taka*. A few were large *taka* holders, but the majority had very small grants which were insufficient to maintain a family. The *taka* was granted on a hereditary basis and served to supplement other income. However, the rights to the *taka* could be negotiated.⁸ Impecunious samurai could use the *taka* as security for a loan and thereby lose control of the rice yield from his salary land for successive

200 *koku* from the annuity of the former daimyo. (Kanichi Asakawa, *Documents of Iriki*, pp. 379 and 385.)

harvests. It was possible for a samurai to purchase the *taka* of another samurai, although the amount of such holdings was restricted in accordance with one's rank in the social hierarchy.

The retrocession of *han* territory for central government administration affected an important source of income for many Satsuma samurai. Since no other *han* had maintained the *chigyō seido*, or method of granting salary land to their warriors, the Meiji statesmen were confronted with the alternatives of insisting on uniform application of governmental regulations and procedures or of making appropriate adjustments for local variations. The government had promised to recompense the former samurai with one-half of the rice payments which their lords had given them previously, but Satsuma samurai who had been getting their income directly from their salary lands, resented the efforts to sever their ties to the land. The system of *taka* payments, therefore, was continued by the local government until 1873, when the land tax reform finally cancelled the rights of the samurai to their salary land.

In 1869 the *han* government took measures to reduce the *taka* holdings of the samurai by designating maximum limits in accordance with social rank. They affected primarily and predominantly the warriors residing in Kagoshima, the *jōkashi*. The nine highest ranking families (including the former territorial lords) were given an annual yield amounting to 1,500 *koku*, which still enabled them to live in style; thirty families were given an hereditary annual income of 300 *koku* plus an additional 200 *koku* for the following fifteen years; five families were allowed an annual income of 300 *koku*; the lower rank *jōhashi* (Kagoshima samurai) were limited to 200 *koku* annually; and the *gōshi* (samurai in the rural districts) were limited to an annual fifty *koku*. The senior bureaucrats were reduced in their aggregate total income from 202,376 *koku* to a mere 26,013 *koku*, or 12.8 per cent of their former *taka* revenue. The surplus which was thus created was appropriated for use by the *han* government.⁹

This reduction of income of the "bureaucratic clique" reflected the shift of power to the lower rank samurai who formed an alliance with the *gōshi* and lesser warriors against

their superiors.¹⁰ The existence of such an alliance may be surmised from the sudden and unaccustomed equality with their city cousins which was accorded to the *gōshi*. The *jōhashi* had formerly scorned the *gōshi* as country bumpkins, and *gōshi* troops had been considered inferior. Military awards for participation in the Restoration movement, for example, had been given only to the *jōkashi*, not to the *gōshi*. This situation was now reversed and the *gōshi* also were entitled to receive merit compensation. Social distinctions between city and country samurai were ordered to be discontinued, and an order of March 1869 forbade *gōshi* from providing menial services to the military, such as taking care of transportation and serving as guides and escorts which were beneath the dignity of samurai.¹¹ Military men of the *ashigaru* rank and *tsukishi*, *tsuki zokuchō*, and *tsuki zoku*, who belonged to a category between samurai and commoner, were maintained in their titles long after the central government had ordered the elimination of class distinctions other than the broad categories of *kazoku*, *shizoku*, and *heimin*, that is, of aristocracy, samurai, and commoner.¹² The insistence of exact titles among these men of lower samurai strata reflected the significance they attached to feudal class status.

Very few of the lower rank samurai suffered from the *taka* adjustment of 1869. In fact, the aggregate total of their *taka* income was raised from 269,328 *koku* to 326,737 *koku*, a net gain of 57,409 *koku*. However, their income generally was very modest. There were some 5,355 families among them who together received a stipend of 137,520 *koku*, or an average of 25.68 *koku* per household.¹³ Since the reform provided for an upper limit of 200 *koku* for samurai of lower status, we may safely assume that the greater number received allotments considerably less than that of the average figure. Three-fifths of these *jōhashi* were of the former *gokoshō gumi* rank, a proud but poor group of samurai whose half-empty stomachs and constant talk of honor had made them a potent revolutionary force. Saigo Takamori, Okubo Toshimichi, Matsukata Masayoshi, and other Meiji leaders had emerged from this group.

The land tax reform of the Meiji government passed in 1873 more seriously affected the economic well-being of the *jōkashi*.

The reform was designed to destroy the complex feudal landholding rights and to establish the principle of private ownership of property. The purpose of the government was to carry out land surveys and establish the value of each plot of land based on the crop yield. When the land value was thus established the surface of the land was to be subject to a 3 per cent annual tax to be paid in money (not rice) by the landowner. Perhaps in order to maintain the high feudal exactions the Kagoshima officials stalled off the land survey in their prefecture until after the Rebellion of 1877, when it was carried out under occupation conditions.¹⁴ This reform was resented by the samurai *taka mochi* (holder of a *taka*) because his rights to the land were severed. It was determined that the *taka* holder was not the landowner. The new landownership was given to the cultivator who had carried the burden of former taxes.

Before the land tax reform the *taka mochi* had first claims to the rice harvest, even before the peasant.¹⁵ After the reform the samurai was paid from the prefectural grain storage, since he had lost his salary land. This meant that he no longer had a guarantee of his share of rice which had always been a commodity in short supply in Kagoshima. In 1875 the government decided to commute the samurai's pensions from payment in kind to money payments. The government of Kagoshima protested in behalf of the former warriors and this order was not carried out in Kagoshima until after the Rebellion. However, the prefectural administration had to pay a part of the annual samurai pension in cash because of the inadequate supply of local rice. The deficiency made up by money payments was calculated on the average price of rice for the past three years. Since the rice price constantly spiraled upward the money payment was never equal in value to its equivalent unit of rice.¹⁶

The *taka* had been only one means of maintaining samurai in Satsuma *han*. Many samurai had no *taka* at all. Some had received maintenance rice as compensation for administrative duties within the *han*. Partial salary was paid by the distribution of paper, oil, sugar, and other commodities to officials. Some had received hereditary allowances as rewards for the participation of their forbears in the Korean campaigns of the late sixteenth

century and in the battle of Sekigahara of 1600.¹⁷ Hence, the samurai salary structure in Kagoshima was extremely complex, causing special problems for administrators of the central government pension plan. Among the many problems was that of samurai officials dispossessed of office, notably the former retainers of the independent territorial lords. Efforts to compromise the central government program in order to adjust to Satsuma's peculiar problems aroused the wrath of non-Satsuma statesmen such as Kido, who were ever on their guard against special favoritism to this region.¹⁸ It is not possible here to go into the details of salary adjustments, relief measures, severance pay, pensions, and other means for alleviating samurai economic distress.¹⁶ It will be seen below, however, that the *gōshi* emerged relatively much better off by the terms of the Meiji government reforms than did their counterpart, the *jōkashi*, in the city of Kagoshima.

The maintenance of numerous samurai outside of the castle-town was a unique feature of Satsuma *han*. Because these warriors were settled in rural districts known as *gō*, they were called *gōshi*. Before the Restoration they were regarded as socially inferior to the *jōkashi*, although many *gōshi* were quite influential and economically well off. Most of the *gōshi* were concentrated in samurai communities known as *fumoto*. The *fumoto* was the seat of district administration and in Satsuma this administration by samurai extended down to the headship of towns, agricultural villages, and fishing hamlets. In other words, the *gōshi* thoroughly dominated the life of the countryside.²⁰

Among the *gōshi* there were great differences in social status and economic standing. Just as the *jōkashi* looked down upon the *gōshi*, so the *fumoto gōshi* scorned those samurai who did not have administrative posts nor steady salary and therefore had to make a living on marginal land outside of the *fumoto*. Such *gōshi* were little better off than peasants. When the *han* government adjusted the *taka* in 1869 there were 37,990 *gōshi* households which received a total of 187,750 *koku* of rice,²¹ or an average of less than five *koku* per family. The distribution of this total was no doubt highly uneven. According to a pre-Restoration record, the *taka* holdings of *gōshi* in one locality were as follows:²²

<i>Number of Households</i>	<i>Amount of Taka</i>
6 families	50.00-100.00 <i>koku</i>
18	20.00- 50.00
19	10.00- 20.00
68	1.00- 10.00
57	0.10- 1.00
170	0.10 and less

In addition to the above 332 families, another 105 families were listed as having less than 0.001 *koku*, and forty of these 105 families received only a token *taka* of a handful of rice.²³ *Gōshi* with such limited *taka* obviously had to rely on other sources of income. The *han* government therefore permitted him to reclaim marginal land which was considered nonofficial land, that is, not subject to periodic redistribution under *han* supervision.

The so-called "official land" (*kan chi*) was land surveyed by the *han* government and distributed for cultivation to peasant groups called *kado*. Periodically, the land was surveyed and redistributed to take account of population changes and soil depletion. The term *kadowari seido*, which distinguishes Satsuma's landholding system, refers to this distribution of arable soil to the *kado*. It was through the *kadowari* system that the daimyo derived his *taka*, mentioned above as being over 720,000 *koku*. More than half of this amount was assigned to samurai as salary land grants.

The *kado* was a social unit of three or four peasant families, though as many as eight families in a *kado* have been recorded.²⁴ These families had the collective responsibility for cultivating the land (often being required to plant cash crops for *han* monopolies), submitting their quota of the rice tax, and rendering compulsory labor services for the local administrators. The head of the *kado* was the *myōzu* who was assisted by two or three *nago*. The *myōzu* and *nago* each had their independent families, but it is probable that they were originally a kinship group, for each *kado* gave honor to a common *kami*, or spirit, and the *nago* on festive occasions gathered under the roof of the *myōzu* to exchange felicitations and demonstrate their solidarity.²⁵

The land assigned by the *han* to the *kado* was divided by the *myōzu*. The share for each of the *nago* was probably smaller than that reserved for the *myōzu*.²⁶ Despite the principle of per-

iodic redistribution the area of land given to a *kado* was relatively fixed and was not affected by an increase of *kado* population. In the earlier Tokugawa period when there were too many families within a *kado*, new units were created by opening up additional land for cultivation. By the time of the Meiji land tax reform which ended the *kado* system, the available land for new *kado* had become very scarce.²⁷ The average yield for a *kado* ranged between twenty to forty *koku*²⁸ and the tax obligation to the state remained the same. For these reasons Japanese economic historians have described the economy of the *kadowari* system as static, or stagnant.²⁹

The labor obligations of the *kado* were also rotated among members of the *kado* under the supervision of the *myōzu*. A person having to perform corvée labor was called an *ibu*. Every healthy male in the *kado* between the ages of fifteen and sixty, thus including the *myōzu* and *nago*, were responsible for such work. At the age of fifteen a youth was said to have entered *ibu* (*ibu iri*) and he was given a plot of land in return for his labor. When he retired from labor obligations, the plot of land reverted to the *kado* for redistribution.³⁰

The *kado* was responsible to the samurai who held hereditary rights to the salary land. Sometimes samurai with large *kyūchi taka* were in control of several *kado*. On the other hand, a single *kado* with its total yield of about twenty *koku* might be jointly owned by several samurai. In the latter case, one of the *taka mochi* was designated as *ryōshu*, literally lord of the fief, and the labor services of the *kado* would all be given to him alone. The *ryōshu* usually, but not always, was the samurai who held the largest share of the *kado taka*. The rice payment of course was made to each of the *taka* holders.³¹

Theoretically, the labor services were for public works or to enable the *gōshi* to devote his attention to his local administrative chores. In practice, the *ryōshu* (fief holder) could easily take advantage of peasant labor obligations to increase his own wealth. Among customary labor services were included such chores as keeping the *ryōshu* samurai's hedges trimmed, yard swept, and buildings in good repair. The *kado* contributed various materials such as bamboo to repair fences. When a typhoon threatened,

the *myōzu's* first responsibility was to rush to the *ryōshu's* residence and shore up the *mon* (main gate) and buttress the walls of buildings. Only after this was completed was he expected to look after his own home.³² During the busy seasons, when the rice seedlings were being transplanted or when the golden grains of rice were being harvested, the *ryōshu* might use labor from the *kado* for his various other land holdings.³³

Gōshi holders of salary land were in a position to take advantage of peasants, whereas the *jōkashi* had to rely on others to oversee their *kado*. The *gōshi* were constantly in contact with the peasants, dominating their lives as *ryōshu* (lords of fields), as administrators, and as money lenders who might charge exorbitant interest rates.³⁴ Thus even after 1873, when the *kado* was formally abolished, the *gōshi's* hold over the peasants continued. Elderly peasants as late as in the Taishō period are reported to have contributed traditional labor services for their former *gōshi* masters.³⁵

The Meiji land tax reform which abolished the *kado* also confirmed the *gōshi* in his possession of nonofficial or non-*kado* land. There were several types of nonofficial land differentiated by their quality and tax obligations and by whether the privilege of ownership extended to the peasants.

Land called *ukimen* were good rice paddies and fields usually located near the *fumoto* and reserved for *gōshi*.³⁶ These choice pieces of land were granted by the *han* government as a supplement to *gōshi* salary. Taxes on *ukimen* were relatively light. Although *ukimen* holdings were described as "self-cultivating, self-harvesting" land, the actual practices of land utilization varied. Often the *gōshi* worked the land by himself. Sometimes free *kado* labor was used to cultivate the *ukimen*. Wealthy *gōshi* frequently rented his *ukimen* to tenants, either peasants or poor *gōshi*. Rent from such land often followed the formula "seven to the lord, three to the cultivator."

Kakechi was land reclaimed by the *gōshi* at his own expense.³⁷ Permission from the *han* was required to open up such land and the amount of *kakechi* which the *gōshi* reclaimed at any one time was restricted. Again, the actual labor for reclamation was available for the wealthy *gōshi* from the *kado* under his control. For

the first three years after development the land was free of tax obligations, so all the produce was kept by the owner. Thereafter, the tax was less than that for *kado* income. As in the case of *ukimen*, *kakechi* fields might be cultivated by the owner, by his household servants, or by tenants.

Eisakuchi was less desirable land which could be reclaimed by either *gōshi* or peasants.³⁸ The tax on this land was high, equal to that for the *kado*. An advantage over the *kado* was that the owner of *eisakuchi*, as suggested by its name, could consider it as his hereditary property not subject to redistribution.

Two other types of land, *mizoshita*, *mikake*, and *oyamano*, were reclaimed from swamps, marshes, or similar marginal terrain.³⁹ The soil being relatively unproductive, taxes were deferred for as long as ten years, and assessments thereafter were of token nature.

The *gōshi* who had command of free *kado* labor acquired more and more reclaimed land of all types. Before 1873 the rapid expansion of nonofficial land restricted the increase of *kado* land. Moreover, the peasant found it more and more difficult to find grazing land for his animals and kindling wood for the hearth and bathhouse.⁴⁰ Whereas the economy of *kado* land was static, the nonofficial land was expansive in character.

This trend was enhanced by the Meiji land tax reform. Feudal holdings of agricultural land were made into private property which the owner could sell if he wished. Impoverished peasants who borrowed from *gōshi* soon found themselves working their former land as the *gōshi*'s tenants. The Meiji reforms thus helped develop the *gōnō*, wealthy farmers with all the conservative social attitudes of the feudal *gōshi*. In Satsuma the Meiji reforms had removed the feudal power structure which had provided progressive leadership in the past, but the social and economic domination of the *gōshi* over the countryside remained intact and was actually strengthened. It was not until the land reform of 1947 that the power of the *gōshi* was reduced, giving the common peasant his first real independence.

NOTES

1. For a brief description of Satsuma society, see Robert K. Sakai, "Feudal Society and Modern Leadership in Satsuma-han," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, pp. 305-76.
2. E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), p. 99 (fn).
3. Torao Haraguchi, *Kagoshima ken no rekishi* (*Kyōdo no rekishi* series), p. 447. Ōyama's title in 1871 was *kengonsanjū*, changed in 1874 to *keurei*.
4. Isoo Iwakata and Tadao Yamada, *Kagoshima ken nōgyō hattatsu shi*, p. 518 (Vol. II and special supplement in series of *Nihon nōgyō hattatsu shi*); Kagoshima Prefecture, *Kagoshima ken shi*, III (1939), 311, (Hereinafter, *Ken shi*.)
5. *Ken shi*, op. cit., pp. 515 and 520-21.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 548-49; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 485; Haraguchi, Fukatani, *Kashūroku chitsumoku shobun no kenkyū* (Tokyo, revised and supplemented, 1944), pp. 206-7.
7. *Ken shi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 731-32; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 459; Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 429.
8. Fukatani, *op. cit.*, p. 206-7; *Ken shi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 733 and 750-51; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 514-15. The sale of *taka* caused wide fluctuation in the income of Satsuma samurai. The Meiji government had to decide whether to give pensions on the basis of the original *taka* or on the basis of current income.
9. Fukatani, *op. cit.*, p. 206; *Ken shi*, *op. cit.*, p. 547.
10. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 519.
11. *Ken shi*, *op. cit.*, p. 551.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 553-56 and 730.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 547-48.
14. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 448. Documents on the land reform in Japanese Ministry of Finance, *Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryō shūsei*, VII, 310 and 325. For a recent study of the land tax reform, see Meiji shiryō kenkyū renraku kai iinkai, *Chisō kaisei to chihō jiji sei* (Tokyo, 1956).
15. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 448.
16. *Ken shi*, *op. cit.*, p. 733.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 358 and 748-49.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 851-58. Gives excerpt of Kido's diary in which he airs his wrath against favoritism for Satsuma.
19. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 559-61 and 737-41.
20. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 492-93.
21. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 427.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
24. Tadao Yamada, *Kadowari sashiki no hokai katei* (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 3-4; Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 430; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 483. A detailed study of the *kadowari* system is found in *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi* (Kagoshima, 1954), pp. 9-53.
25. Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-15; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 485 and 485.
26. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 483.
27. *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

28. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 484 and 508; Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 429.
29. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 506; *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi*, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
30. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 483 and 488.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 489.
32. Senzo Hidemura, *Sappan ni okeru ichijūsō gūshi no rōdō soshiki* (reprint, n.d.) pp. 317-49; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 488; Torao Haraguchi, "Satsuma fumoto no shōgatsu," *Nihon rekishi*, 151 (Jan. 1961), 31-34.
33. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 430.
34. Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 506-12.
35. Hidemura, *op. cit.*, p. 345.
36. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 423; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 488-90.
37. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-27; Iwakata and Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-92; *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-67.
38. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-27; *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66 and 70-72.
39. Haraguchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-27.
40. *Kagoshima nōchi kaikaku shi*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.